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THE IMPORTANCE OF SCHOLARSHIP TO LAW
SCHOOL EXCELLENCE
William E. Nelson*
As we have learned from Dan Coquillette,1 Bob Kaczorowski,2 and John
Sexton,3 access to substantial funding is undoubtedly a prerequisite for a law
school to enjoy excellence. Funding, that is, is a necessary, but not sufficient
condition for excellence. Something else—intellectual vision—is also
required.
In the 1930s, Fordham University School of Law was, if not a peer, surely
a rival of Columbia Law School. Fordham then had a special intellectual
mission of national political importance.4 By the 1950s, however, Fordham’s
mission, as articulated in the 1930s, had become politically and intellectually
irrelevant. As a result, Fordham declined and became just an ordinary, good
law school.
In the 1950s, Harvard Law School was the preeminent law school in the
United States. Its faculty promoted an intellectual agenda that paralleled the
judicial agenda of a majority of the justices of the Supreme Court of the
United States.5 By the 1980s, however, both the Supreme Court’s and
Harvard’s agendas had changed, thereby ending Harvard’s intellectual and
institutional supremacy.
In this Article, I examine the relationship between ideas and institutional
excellence in legal education. Although I differ with him in regard to some
details, Bob Kaczorowski has discussed the importance of ideas in the history

* Edward Weinfeld Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. The author is
indebted to Robert Kaczorowski for his comments and to the Filomen D’Agostino and Max
E. Greenberg Faculty Research Fund of New York University School of Law for research
support. This Article was prepared for the Symposium entitled Legal Education in TwentiethCentury America, held at New York University’s Villa La Pietra conference center in
Florence, Italy, on July 2–4, 2018. For an overview of the Symposium, see Matthew Diller,
Foreword: Legal Education in Twentieth-Century America, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 859 (2018).
1. See Bruce A. Kimball & Daniel R. Coquillette, History and Harvard Law School, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 883 (2018).
2. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Fordham University School of Law: A Case Study of
Legal Education in Twentieth-Century America, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 861 (2018).
3. See John Sexton, Subsidiarity and Federalism: The Relationship Between Law
Schools and Their Universities, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 911 (2018).
4. See infra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 77–86 and accompanying text.

939

940

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

of Fordham Law School, and so I will use his excellent book6 to articulate a
paradigm that explains how ideas relate to institutional development. I will
then use the paradigm to examine developments at Harvard Law School
parallel to those that occurred earlier at Fordham. I agree with John Sexton
that a good law school must be concerned with the “ought” of the law as well
as the “is.”7 But my paradigm goes beyond that and shows that a leading or
outstanding law school must view the “ought” in the context of political and
societal debates ongoing in the nation at the time.
Fordham Law School may have been founded, at least in part, to enable
Catholic students who could not attend the likes of Columbia, Harvard, and
Yale to obtain a legal education.8 But its principal purpose appears to have
been the propagation of a Roman Catholic conception of law. For example,
Father John Collins, who was Fordham University’s president at the time of
the Law School’s founding, saw “professional schools” as “mediums . . . for
the uplifting of mankind,” and he accordingly charged the new law school
with preserving in students “a belief in higher things than those which can be
seen with the eye and touched with the hand.”9 To achieve this end, Fordham
required all students to take a course in legal ethics and a course in
jurisprudence that contained a significant ethical component.10
Joseph A. Warren, the Law School’s registrar, elaborated on this view of
ethics. According to Warren’s Catholic perspective, the law “control[s]
man’s outward relations with the state and with his fellow man.”11 Ethics, in
turn, control man’s “inner relations . . . with his Creator.”12 In Warren’s
view, the two could not “be divorced,” and hence he found it “essential that
the student should bring to the study of law a mind well grounded and trained
in the correct science of Ethics.”13 Fordham Law School’s course in legal
ethics was designed to achieve that end.
The course in jurisprudence was even more Catholic. In the Law School’s
first sixteen years, Father Terence J. Shealy, a Jesuit, taught this course from
the perspective of Thomistic Scholasticism’s natural law philosophy.14
According to Kaczorowski, Shealy “assumed the existence of immutable
metaphysical principles, and he attributed these principles of causation to
God and the knowledge of these principles to ‘an infallible source,’ the
Catholic Church.”15

6. See generally ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, FORDHAM UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW: A
HISTORY (2012).
7. See Sexton, supra note 3, at 921.
8. See KACZOROWSKI, supra note 6, at 5 (“Fordham Law School was intended to raise
Catholic immigrants and their sons into positions of leadership in professional, economic, and
political life.”).
9. Id. at 15 (quoting archival materials).
10. See id. at 15–16.
11. Id. at 15 (quoting archival materials).
12. Id. (quoting archival materials).
13. Id. at 15–16 (quoting archival materials).
14. Id. at 16–17.
15. Id. at 17.
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Shealy’s successor, Father Francis LeBuffe, another Jesuit, similarly
rooted his jurisprudence course “in the doctrine of Natural Law and natural
rights and consequently in an objective, real standard of justice.”16 LeBuffe
argued that American political theory, as expressed in the Declaration of
Independence and Constitution, had “evolved from Roman Catholic
thought.”17 Thirty years after Fordham Law School’s founding, yet another
Jesuit, Father John Pyne, was still teaching that the rules of human law were
“based on natural law—moral law.”18 This Roman Catholic perspective on
law and legal education was generally well received by Fordham students.19
With the development of legal realism and the coming of the New Deal in
the 1930s, Fordham’s natural law Thomistic Scholasticism became
politically important. Father LeBuffe, for one, published a book on
jurisprudence in 1938, which he described as “stand[ing] in flat
contradiction” to the totalitarian philosophy of Nazis and Communists, as
well as to “the totalitarian philosophy of Justice Holmes and his followers”—
that is, the legal realists.20 In a series of articles published between 1925 and
1940, another Fordham professor, Walter B. Kennedy, who was “perhaps the
most widely respected Catholic legal scholar” of his time, similarly defended
Thomistic jurisprudence and attacked legal realism.21 Meanwhile, the dean
of the Law School, Ignatius Wilkinson, an opponent of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s New Deal and its reliance on legal realist jurisprudence, gave
important testimony against the president’s Court-packing scheme.22
As we know, the legal realist leanings of Oliver Wendell Holmes and of
Franklin Roosevelt’s appointees to the Supreme Court came to dominate the
Court and the rest of the American judiciary in the aftermath of the late
1930s.23 But, for my purposes, legal realism’s victory is not what mattered
when Fordham was at its pinnacle. What mattered was that Fordham Law
School was a leader in the battle against legal realism and the New Deal; its
leadership role made it not simply a good law school but an important one
that stood out from the mass of other law schools.
Most law is dull, and it is boring both for professors to teach it and students
to learn it. Discussing whether the rule against perpetuities invalidates a
particular future interest simply is not exciting. Law becomes exciting,
16. Id. at 144 (quoting FRANCIS P. LEBUFFE, OUTLINES OF PURE JURISPRUDENCE i (1924)).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 19 (quoting the revised remarks of Governor Malcolm Wilson at the opening of
Fordham’s sesquicentennial celebration at the Rose Hill campus on September 30, 1990).
19. See id. at 16–17.
20. Id. at 145 (quoting FRANCIS P. LEBUFFE & JAMES V. HAYES, THE AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW WITH CASES TO ILLUSTRATE PRINCIPLES vi (1947)).
21. See id. at 146 (quoting EDWARD A. PURCELL JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY:
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 163–64 (1973)). See generally Walter
B. Kennedy, A Review of Legal Realism, 9 FORDHAM L. REV. 362 (1940); Walter B. Kennedy,
The Scientific Approach in the Law, 70 U.S. L. REV. 75 (1936); Walter B. Kennedy, Utility of
Legal Philosophy, 3 N.Y. L. REV. 353 (1925).
22. See KACZOROWSKI, supra note 6, at 147.
23. See William H. Rehnquist, Presidential Appointments to the Supreme Court, 2 CONST.
COMMENT. 319, 326 (1985).
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however, when the well-being of the nation or the future of liberty depends
on what authorities determine the law to be. Law was exciting for members
of the Fordham Law School community in the late 1930s because the
scholarship that faculty members were writing, the testimony they were
giving, the teaching they were doing, and the material students were learning
mattered politically. Students and faculty alike were participants in a
struggle over the American soul—they believed that the future of the nation,
of liberty, and indeed of the world depended on their winning that struggle.
Ultimately, of course, it mattered greatly that the members of the Fordham
community lost the struggle, but in the midst of the struggle it did not matter
at all. Fordham Law professors were players on a national stage, and their
student audiences were intimately involved in the play. Students and faculty
alike shared in the excitement surrounding them, and all were aroused by the
struggle they were participating in.
This excitement attracted students to Fordham Law School: a student
could go to Fordham and be part of a struggle over the future of the nation,
or could attend New York University (NYU), St. John’s, or Brooklyn Law
School and learn about the rule against perpetuities. As one Fordham student
had earlier written, “the palpable and almost universal defect in our law
school system [wa]s the exaggerated technicalization of the law.”24 In most
law schools, “the reasons of law and government . . . [we]re sacrificed for the
practical and the technical”—for the rule against perpetuities—thereby
reducing the profession of law “to a trade, and the presumably scientific
lawyer a skilful [sic] clerk.”25 The “special feature of the Fordham system,”
in contrast, was its understanding that “legal training must ever be a question
of vital public interest.”26
The role of Fordham in the late-1930s battles over legal realism and the
New Deal attracted not only students but also public attention. New Yorkers
who paid attention to national events understood that the Fordham Law
School community’s efforts would help determine the course the nation
would take; Columbia was the only other law school in New York whose
faculty and alumni were players on the national stage. That put Fordham
together with Columbia in the same league as Harvard and Yale, while law
schools such as NYU, Brooklyn, and St. John’s remained minor-league
institutions distantly behind Fordham.
Fordham’s reputation as a major institution lasted for about two decades.27
The summer after my graduation from college in 1962, I worked as a delivery
boy for my father’s business. One day I delivered to a middle-aged Roman
Catholic customer who had learned, probably from my parents, that I would
be going to law school in the fall. Her question was fascinating—“where are
you going,” she asked, “Fordham or Harvard?” When I responded that I
planned to attend NYU as a Root-Tilden Scholar, she did not understand.
24.
25.
26.
27.

KACZOROWSKI, supra note 6, at 18 (quoting a third-year student).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 205.
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This woman’s knowledge was outdated, as was likely true of the
knowledge of many people who were not experts. Nonetheless, her question
makes the point that, for some time, Fordham was an outstanding law
school—a law school in competition with Ivy League schools—both in the
reality of what its faculty and students were striving to accomplish and in
public perception. I agree with the student quoted above that Fordham’s
stature rested on its propagation of a legal ideology—natural law Thomistic
Scholasticism, which was especially attractive to Roman Catholics like my
father’s customer—an ideology locked in struggle with the legal realism of
Columbia Law School and the emerging jurisprudence of Harvard Law
School.
In the aftermath of World War II, however, Fordham Law School’s unique
approach to jurisprudence came to an end. Professor Walter Kennedy died
in 1945,28 and Dean Ignatius Wilkinson passed on in 1953;29 they were not
replaced by like-minded faculty. The most important change, however, was
in the required jurisprudence course. The change occurred in 1962 when
Father Charles M. Whalen, yet another Jesuit, joined the law school faculty.30
Kaczorowski notes that it was important to Whalen “and his philosophy of
legal education that students understand that he was not trying to sell any
Catholic line in his teaching” but “simply trying to make students aware of
the big questions in jurisprudence.”31 Accordingly, he stopped wearing
clerical garb and began to dress as a layman.32 More importantly, he did not
teach from Father LeBuffe’s jurisprudence text but assigned readings by
diverse authors such as Walter Lippman, Plato, and Professor Lon Fuller of
Harvard Law School.33 Whalen also “distributed notes on different versions
of natural law, cautioning students not to think that natural law meant only
one thing, the Scholastic version of natural law.”34
The change in Fordham’s approach to jurisprudence was inevitable in light
of the larger changes occurring in postwar American culture. In the 1930s
Roman Catholics remained a separate and distinct minority in American
culture with some churchmen striving to proselytize others to accept
Catholicism’s moral and religious views.35 But World War II transformed
the place of Catholics.36 Largely as a result of the GI Bill, Catholics began
to enter mainstream national life, which led to integration into mainstream
American business, educational, and residential culture.37 Mid-twentieth28. Walter Kennedy, A Dean at Fordham, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1945, at 14.
29. 400 Mourn at Mass for Dean Wilkinson, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1953, at 19.
30. See KACZOROWSKI, supra note 6, at 150.
31. Id. at 151–52.
32. Id. at 151.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See JOHN T. MCGREEVY, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM: A HISTORY 153–
56, 162 (2003) (discussing Catholic leaders’ promotion of barriers to divorce, film censorship,
and birth control restrictions).
36. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY IN
NEW YORK, 1920–1980, at 168–69 (2001).
37. See id. at 168–69, 246.
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century Catholics, unlike many early twentieth-century ones, began to think
like other Americans and to accept mainstream ideas and values, and the
church tamped down its belief system to accommodate them.38 The change
in Fordham Law School’s jurisprudence course merely reflected this larger
change in the place of Catholics in American society and in the faith of the
American Catholic Church.
Meanwhile, the Thomistic Scholasticism of such scholars as Walter
Kennedy and Ignatius Wilkinson had suffered total political defeat. Naturallaw and natural-rights thinking no longer served as vehicles for arguing
against the constitutionality of New Deal initiatives; in cases like Wickard v.
Filburn,39 the Supreme Court had left no doubt that Congress had
unconstrained, plenary power to regulate the economy.40 When Republicans
regained control of Congress in 1946 and retained it in several subsequent
elections, the Court stopped considering the constitutionality of regulatory
legislation.41 Opposition to the New Deal and its regulatory legacy instead
resurfaced in Congress in the form of legislation such as the Taft-Hartley
Act42 and political movements such as McCarthyism. Although the Church
often participated in anti-Communist efforts, its main motive for
participating was not Thomistic Scholasticism but concern for the well-being
of Catholics behind the Iron Curtain.43
At the same time, a new issue of social policy was emerging before the
Supreme Court. During and after World War II, African Americans began
demanding an end to segregation and other forms of racial discrimination.44
The executive branch took some steps to meet their demands, most notably
desegregation of the military,45 but Congress, where action was blocked by
Southern Democratic power on congressional committees and by threats of
filibusters in the Senate, did nothing.46 By the early 1950s, it was clear that
the Supreme Court would be the principal institution to determine the
legitimacy of segregation.47
The difficulty was that putting an end to segregation and racial
discrimination was, in essence, a matter of politics and public policy. The
38. See MCGREEVY, supra note 35, at 220–21 (discussing the effect of greater Catholic
integration through an increase in college attendance, movement from urban areas to the
suburbs, and higher intermarriage rates).
39. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
40. Id. at 128.
41. See David P. Currie, Constitution in the Supreme Court: The New Deal, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 504, 554–55 (1987).
42. See generally Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136
(1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–197 (2012)).
43. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, FIGHTING FOR THE CITY: A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK CITY
CORPORATION COUNSEL 195–201 (2008).
44. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 216–18, 224–27, 238 (2004).
45. See id. at 254.
46. See ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE SENATE 78–
105, 212–22, 855–85 (2002).
47. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S.
629 (1950).

2018]

SCHOLARSHIP AND LAW SCHOOL EXCELLENCE

945

New Deal Court in the late 1930s implicitly declined to decide issues of
politics and policy, and key members of the Court, led by Justice Felix
Frankfurter, maintained that the Court could decide only issues of law and
should abstain from deciding matters of politics.48 Thus the task for legal
academics who sought to be in dialogue with the Court was to develop a set
of principles elaborating how the Court could remedy segregation and racial
discrimination as a matter of law rather than politics.
Thomistic
Scholasticism had nothing to contribute to this task, and thus Fordham Law
professors had nothing distinctive to add to the discussion. Unlike what it
had been in the 1930s, Fordham Law School simply became one of many
good law schools training students to be legal technicians. It was no longer
a distinctive player on the national jurisprudential stage and, consequently,
did not radiate the excitement or enjoy the prestige of being on that stage.
As a 1986 report of an ABA inspection team noted, Fordham Law School
no longer had a clear mission.49 The report declared it “essential” that the
Law School “define its mission, derive its objectives and goals from that
mission, and then determine the policies and actions necessary to carry out
the mission.”50 The school’s lack of mission was reflected, in turn, in the
faculty’s scholarship. Although the faculty wrote “a steady stream of books,
articles . . . and other legal writing,” it produced essentially descriptive work
that did “a fine job disseminating legal knowledge,” but did “not advance
legal knowledge through scholarly inquiry.”51 Even the best of the faculty’s
scholarship, John D. Calamari’s and Joseph M. Perillo’s treatise, The Law of
Contracts,52 focused primarily on disseminating legal doctrine rather than
evaluating it. Such scholarship, in the words of a subsequent ABA inspection
report, tended to “detract from a school’s image both external and internal.”53
What the history of Fordham Law School thus suggests is that a school
cannot be great unless it strives to advance some unique intellectual agenda.
From the time of its founding until the 1940s, Fordham’s agenda was to
proselytize the Roman Catholic Church’s vision of natural law.54 This
mission made the Law School a unique, exciting rival of Columbia Law
School that presented a powerful message to both students and outside
observers. And, when the Catholic understanding of natural law became a
political weapon in the hands of opponents of legal realism and the New
Deal,55 Fordham Law School approached the pinnacle of legal education.
With the triumph of realism and the New Deal, however, Fordham’s
prominence faded. Key faculty died, unique Catholic ideas fell into
desuetude, and the Jesuit jurisprude charged with proselytizing the Catholic
48. See KLUGER, supra note 44, at 238–41, 279–81.
49. See KACZOROWSKI, supra note 6, at 330–31.
50. Id. at 331 (quoting a 1986 site inspection report).
51. Id. (quoting a 1986 site inspection report).
52. See generally JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW
(1977).
53. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 6, at 332 (quoting a 1986 report).
54. See supra notes 9–19 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
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agenda abandoned the effort.56 Father Whalen’s jurisprudence course
became merely a survey of jurisprudential options, and with it, Fordham
became just one more good law school among many others.
I see a similar trajectory in the history of Harvard Law School. Of course,
Harvard has always enjoyed a higher ranking than Fordham. For most of the
century prior to about 1970, Harvard was not simply a rival to Columbia Law
School. Harvard was the preeminent law school in the United States. The
similarity that I see between Fordham and Harvard is that Harvard’s
preeminence, like the prominence of Fordham, rested significantly on its
commitment to a unique intellectual mission of national importance. When
that mission lost its vitality around 1970, Harvard’s preeminence
disappeared, and Harvard Law School became merely one of several
outstanding American schools, although its financial resources and history
continued to give it a better reputation and higher standing than that enjoyed
by Fordham.
Harvard’s rise to preeminence began with the appointment of Christopher
Columbus Langdell as dean of the Law School in 1870.57 Langdell had a
mission—to introduce into legal education, first at Harvard and then
elsewhere, the case method and the Socratic method in lieu of the lecture
method.58 This mission, on its face, might seem trivial, but it was related to
a deeper understanding of what Langdell wanted American law to be.
Langdell envisioned law as a science in which answers to legal questions
could be discovered through internal analysis of the sources of law,
especially past judicial precedents.59 Law, according to Langdell, was not
merely an adjunct of politics, and he did not want legal questions to be
answered nor legal disputes resolved by determining the answer or resolution
most consistent with the political values of the current holders of
governmental power.60 He wanted legal answers and the resolution of
disputes to be neutral, objective, and independent of the political will of those
holding power. “Law, considered as a science,” Langdell wrote, “consist[s]
of certain principles or doctrines,” the mastery of which so “as to be able to
apply them with constant . . . facility and . . . certainty . . . [is] what
constitute[s] a true lawyer.”61 According to Langdell, for a true lawyer, law
should be distinct from and transcend politics.
Langdell quickly made his mission of developing an apolitical, scientific
conception of law—what we today might call a professional conception—
the mission of Harvard Law School.62 That mission, in turn, gave Harvard
56. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
57. See Martha Minow, Marking 200 Years of Legal Education: Traditions of Change,
Reasoned Debate, and Finding Differences and Commonalities, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2279,
2282–83 (2017).
58. See id. at 2283.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2284.
61. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830–1900, at 84
(1982) (alterations in original) (quoting C. C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS vi (1871)).
62. See Minow, supra note 57, at 2284.
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national prominence.63 Nearly forty years ago I wrote that American thinkers
were growing disenchanted with the course of American politics and
lawmaking in the aftermath of the Civil War.64 American freedoms seemed
threatened as political majorities in Congress rode roughshod over the
presidency, the Supreme Court, southern state governments, and political
opponents in general.65 Reformers saw a need for “new standard[s]” that, in
the words of E. L. Godkin, would “place men’s relations in society where
they never yet ha[d] been placed, under the control of trained human
reason.”66 Langdell’s introduction of the Socratic case method into Harvard
Law School provided reform thinkers with precisely what they were seeking
in the vital field of law—an ideology that understood law as a product of
trained human reason rather than the political will of those who happened to
be in power. It tied law to its established past rather than to some new
political future. To overstate, Langdell’s vision of law as a science reset the
path of the law from one of radical, majoritarian, and egalitarian reform by
Congress to the conservative path of the rule of law—from the radical
Reconstruction dream of equality for all people, black as well as white, to
law’s protection of the status quo and, with it, support for the wealth and
power of established elites. It is no wonder that Langdell’s vision of law
spread throughout American legal education between 1870 and the early
twentieth century and made Harvard the preeminent law school in America.
Harvard Law School remained the model for professional, scientific
analysis of the law well into the second half of the twentieth century.
Although the model was intrinsically a conservative one, it often produced
moderately progressive scholarship in the hands of faculty members who
pursued it. James Bradley Thayer was one such faculty scholar; he, more
than anyone else, developed the argument that the Supreme Court should
normally defer to the political process and deploy its power of judicial review
sparingly by striking down only legislation that unambiguously violates
explicit constitutional norms.67 Zechariah Chafee wrote powerfully in
support of freedom of speech, especially the free speech rights of political
dissidents caught up in the Red Scare of the early 1920s.68 An important
progressive member of the faculty, Felix Frankfurter, wrote and litigated on
behalf of immigrants and labor unions and later became a key advisor to the
New Deal, while always preserving his commitment to professionalism and
the rule of law.69 The most noted opponent of the Supreme Court’s
conservative, laissez-faire jurisprudence in the 1910s and 1920s, however,
was the dean of Harvard Law School, Roscoe Pound. I have always found
Pound’s writings superficial because it has never been clear to me whether
63. Id. at 2283.
64. See generally NELSON, supra note 61.
65. See id. at 72–81.
66. Id. at 82.
67. See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 155–56 (1893).
68. See generally ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920).
69. See H. N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 67–78, 90–94, 99–124 (1981).
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his criticism of the Court was that the Court was too conservative or that it
was behaving too politically. But many took Pound seriously in the 1910s
and 1920s, perhaps because his jurisprudence was viewed as both
progressive and at the same time supportive of professionalism and the rule
of law.70
Two noteworthy Harvard graduates on the Supreme Court, Justices Oliver
Wendell Holmes and Louis D. Brandeis, further exemplified the Harvard
position. Both were outstanding lawyers. Brandeis, in particular, paid
detailed attention to legal doctrine and careful legal argument, while Holmes
had written what remains one of America’s great legal studies.71 At the same
time, both justices typically voted in support of progressive causes, ranging
from freedom of speech72 to upholding redistributive regulatory legislation.73
As a result of the work and standing of the Harvard justices and the Harvard
faculty, it was clear by the early 1930s that Harvard Law School was the
preeminent professional law school in the United States, simultaneously
supporting progressive causes within the constraints of the rule of law.
Harvard Law School’s last great intellectual effort was the propagation of
legal process jurisprudence. Legal process should be understood as a
successor to Harvard’s longstanding support of progressive causes within the
confines of the rule of law. The great scholar of legal process was, of course,
Harvard professor Henry M. Hart, who initially worked alone and, later,
worked with Albert M. Sacks.
Hart began his legal process work when he started teaching Harvard Law
School’s legislation course in the late 1930s.74 By no later than 1940 he had
entered into a joint enterprise with Abe Feller, an instructor at Yale, and
Walter Gellhorn, at Columbia, and by the academic year 1941–42, they had
produced a mimeographed edition of materials on legislation.75 World War
II interrupted Hart’s work, but when he returned to Harvard for the academic
year 1946–47, he continued to develop materials for his legislation course.76
Sacks joined him in 1952–53, and by 1958 they had produced the tentative
and final mimeographed edition of materials, entitled The Legal Process:
Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law (“The Legal
Process”).77
The dates are important because they reveal a great deal about legal
process theory. Although the 1958 edition of The Legal Process focused

70. DAVID WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND: PHILOSOPHER OF LAW 181–254 (1974).
71. See generally O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881).
72. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
73. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277, 281 (1918) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
74. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, A Historical and Critical Introduction
to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW i, lxxiv (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994).
75. Id. at lxxiv–lxxv.
76. Id. at lxxvii–lxxviii.
77. Id. at lxxxv–lxxxvii, xci.
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mainly on private law, its goal was to articulate a theory of public law.78
There were two principal public law issues during the decade between 1946
and 1958, when The Legal Process was in gestation: (1) a series of Supreme
Court cases beginning with Dennis v. United States79 in 1951 and
culminating in Yates v. United States80 in 1957, in which the Court addressed
the issue of freedom of speech for Communists and other radical dissidents;
and (2) the issue of segregation and racial discrimination, exemplified by the
1954 case of Brown v. Board of Education.81
Another seed of legal process theory was a “Legal Philosophy Discussion
Group” that met at Harvard Law School during the 1956–57 academic year.82
In addition to Hart and Sacks, Lon Fuller, Paul Freund, and three important
visiting professors—H. L. A. Hart, Julius Stone, and Herbert Wechsler—
participated in the group.83 The topic for the year was “Administrative and
Judicial Discretion.”84 All the participants agreed that discretion was an
essential element of all legal decision-making, but they also agreed that
discretion had to be controlled by institutional structures and practices,
procedural safeguards, and what Hart called a requirement of “reasoned
elaboration.”85 Discretion was essential if society was to enjoy progress, but
discretion had to be subjected to professional control in order to preserve the
rule of law and individual freedom.86
Thus, legal process theory, like the jurisprudence of Harvard Law School
since Louis D. Brandeis, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and James Bradley Thayer,
sought to maintain a balance between progressive aspirations and the
maintenance of professionalism and the rule of law. To quote Professors
Eskridge and Frickey, the editors of the published version of the Hart and
Sacks The Legal Process materials, it was an effort on the part of
“comfortable law professors [who were] preparing their students to run the
country” to bring about “incremental change through duly established
procedures, with a libertarian rather than egalitarian view of Brown, and with
principles that were neutral and reasoning that was universal.”87 In this form,
legal process theory was responsive to demands of dissidents for free speech;
it readily explained and justified the transformation of constitutional doctrine
that occurred between the Dennis and Yates cases. Individual rights and
societal progress were not in tension in the free speech cases. In dealing with
free speech, legal process jurisprudence was thereby able to reflect a
culmination of Harvard Law School’s thinking since the turn of the twentieth

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at c–cii.
341 U.S. 494 (1951).
354 U.S. 298 (1957).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 74, at c.
Id.
Id. at c–ci.
Id. at cii.
See id. at c–cii.
Id. at cxii–cxiii.
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century about progressive reform within the rule of law on behalf of white
men.
Legal process theory was more problematic, however, in the context of
race. Professors Eskridge and Frickey note that both Hart and Sacks were
strong supporters of efforts to end segregation and racial discrimination.88
Most other legal process theorists also defended the Brown decision. The
most notable defense was that of Alexander M. Bickel, a student of Hart and
a law clerk for Justice Frankfurter,89 who published “The Original
Understanding and the Segregation Decision,”90 which was based on a bench
memo he wrote for the Justice.91 The article found the Fourteenth
Amendment sufficiently capacious to allow for the Court’s decision in
Brown,92 but, as I read it, did not establish that the Amendment compelled
Brown’s result. Although several noteworthy articles93 did argue that Brown
was not only permissible but also right, I have never understood that their
defense rested on legal process grounds.
Legal process theory simply conflicted with the aspirations for racial
equality as those aspirations developed during the 1960s. Legal process, as
I understand it, contemplated the gradual assimilation of African Americans
into an established, unchanging legal and social order, just as Catholic and
Jewish immigrants were being assimilated. According to Professors
Eskridge and Frickey, Hart and Sacks, by insisting that “change” could be
“accomplished only through . . . ‘duly established’ institutions and
mechanisms,” acquiesced “in the political status quo”;94 they envisioned
African Americans slowly assimilating into a culture that would remain
unchanged. Their insistence, however, “was discordant with the experiences
of many . . . people of color” for whom “‘duly established mechanisms of
change’ were neither responsive nor even tolerant.”95 Martin Luther King,
Jr., for one, vociferously demanded immediate, not gradual, equality. To the
suggestion that blacks wait, King responded:
“Wait” has almost always meant “Never.” . . .
We have waited for more than 340 years for our constitutional and
God-given rights. . . . [W]hen you see the vast majority of your twenty
million Negro brothers smothering in an airtight cage of poverty in the
midst of an affluent society; when you suddenly find your tongue twisted
and your speech stammering as you seek to explain to your six-year-old
daughter why she can’t go to the public amusement park that has just been
advertised on television, . . . and see ominous clouds of inferiority
beginning to form in her little mental sky, and see her beginning to distort
88. Id. at cvii–cix.
89. Id. at cxvi.
90. 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955).
91. See id. at 1.
92. See id. at 64.
93. See generally, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation
Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960); Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial
Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959).
94. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 74, at cxi.
95. Id.
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her personality by developing an unconscious bitterness toward white
people; . . . when you are harried by day and haunted by night by the fact
that you are a Negro, living constantly at tiptoe stance, never quite knowing
what to expect next, and are plagued with inner fears and outer
resentments; . . . then you will understand why we find it difficult to wait.96

Legal process theory failed to adequately respond not only to the demands
of African Americans but also to the next group of political dissidents—
young opponents of the Vietnam War.97 Duly established institutions were
neither responsive nor tolerant when students in the late 1960s made clear
that they were unwilling to die in Vietnam for what they saw as a lie. One
of my first-year law students at Harvard Law School in those years was a
young second lieutenant who had just returned from Vietnam. I eagerly
asked him to tell me what he knew about the war so that I could better counsel
other young men who sought my advice on whether to accept the draft, to
refuse to report for induction, or to flee to Canada. But he would not tell me
what he knew.
His refusal to impart his knowledge made it impossible for me, in many
respects a legal process acolyte who hoped that reasoned analysis could help
solve the crisis that other young men faced, to speak effectively to those
young men. I have always assumed that his knowledge also made it
impossible for him to accept the reasoned elaboration of Professors Hart and
Sacks in his second and third years at Harvard Law School. “Sometimes,
sometimes,” as even Hart knew, “you just have to do the right thing”98 and
not engage in wrong things, and reasoned elaboration did not help decide
what was right.
Yet another failure of legal process theory, this time in the early 1970s,
occurred in response to feminism. Women demanded equality, one element
of which was the power to control their own bodies and choose whether and
when to bear a child. Roe v. Wade99 gave women that power, but not in
accordance with legal process precepts. Roe was not a legal process opinion;
it reflected activist, political decision-making even on the part of three of the
four justices that President Richard Nixon had appointed to the Court to limit
the Court’s activist tendencies. Legal process theory and full gender equality
were simply at odds; courts adhering to legal process concepts could not give
women the full equality they sought when the political process was not
prepared to confer it.
Meanwhile, the judicial inspiration of legal process, Justice Frankfurter,
suffered a stroke and was forced to retire in 1962; he died in 1965.100 In
1971, the last true legal process acolyte on the Supreme Court, the younger

96. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 64,
69–70 (Signet Classic 2000) (1963).
97. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 74, at cxix n.306.
98. Id. at cxiii (quoting Hart’s comments, as recalled by David Chambers).
99. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
100. See Felix Frankfurter Is Dead; Influenced the Law Widely, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1965,
at 1, 26.
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John Marshall Harlan, left the Court and died shortly thereafter.101 The two
academic leaders of legal process, Hart and Sacks, passed off the scholarly
scene about the same time: Hart died in 1969,102 and Sacks moved into
administration as dean of Harvard Law School in 1971.103 Alexander M.
Bickel,104 another leading legal process thinker, died in 1974.105
Moreover, for activists and student sympathizers in the late 1960s and
early 1970s—young people committed to “doing the right thing” without
delay—legal process theory offered no help.106 They needed something
different. In response to that need, African American and feminist scholars
developed over the course of the next decades two new categories of
scholarship—what we now know as critical race theory107 and feminist
jurisprudence.108 At the same time, the critical legal studies (CLS)
movement, led by young Harvard Law School faculty members together with
faculty from other law schools, sought to articulate a more comprehensive
jurisprudential alternative to legal process by understanding law as simply a
form of politics. In the words of Joseph Singer, a CLS scholar and now a
faculty member at Harvard Law School, legal principles are “fundamentally
contradictory.”109 It follows that:
Since every legal decision reverts to the fundamental contradiction, we
have no alternative but to decide each case in the light of competing goals
and interests. To make these decisions, nothing can aid us except the same
moral and political arguments we use in other areas of ethical discourse. It
is an illusion to think that legal reasoning is any less political and subjective
than the reasoning used by legislators, voters and other political actors.110

It is difficult to imagine a more clear-cut abandonment of Harvard Law
School’s century-long commitment to professionalism, which began with
Langdell, continued through Frankfurter, and ended with legal process theory
that developed in detail the need to focus on institutional structures,
procedural safeguards, and reasoned elaboration as the foundations of
professionalism.
I was one of many outsiders who worried in a 1988 article that CLS’s turn
to politics and abandonment of professional traditions and standards would
101. Lesley Oelsner, Harlan Dies at 72; on Court 16 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1971, at
1, 29.
102. Henry M. Hart Jr., Harvard Teacher, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1969, at 56.
103. See Alfonso A. Narvaez, Albert M. Sacks, 70, Harvard Law Dean and Noted Teacher,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1991, at 28.
104. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
105. Alexander M. Bickel Dies; Constitutional Law Expert, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1974, at
42.
106. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 74, at cxix n.306.
107. See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
108. See generally FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS (Cynthia Grant
Bowman et al. eds., 4th ed. 2011).
109. Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from
Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 1058–59.
110. Id. at 1059.
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“undermine law rather than use it to better society.”111 I expressed my “fear”
of “government in accordance with the naked political preferences of . . . [a
Middle America] majority” and could “think of no way to restrain this
majority other than by appeals to law.”112 I therefore urged “legal
scholars . . . to strengthen the capacity of law to restrain tyranny by building
as much objective and determinate content into it as possible”113 rather than
focus on law’s fundamental contradictions. Now, during the presidency of
Donald Trump, I value professionalism and objectivity in law even more as,
possibly, the last defense against arbitrary tyranny.
What is clear to me in retrospect is that an old guard of the Harvard faculty
in the 1970s and 1980s had concerns similar to those I have just expressed.
They fought the young CLS faculty to preserve professional norms and
standards.114 The result was two decades of civil war at Harvard Law School
as CLS faculty argued for a purely political vision of law and the legal
system, in the process undermining faith in professional norms, while the old
guard strove to uphold those professional traditions. In the end, the old guard
failed, with the result that today’s Harvard Law School no longer adheres to
a special, unwavering mission of professionalism. The effort of the CLS
movement to give Harvard a new politically progressive mission also failed,
although the movement generally helped politicize law. Thus, Harvard Law
School has been left with no clear mission, which has pushed it, like Fordham
before, into a period of decline. Harvard’s resources and traditions continue
to make it a great law school, but it is no longer the preeminent law school in
the United States.
What I have said points me toward some vague speculations with which I
would like to end. Fordham Law School and Harvard Law School both
attained their greatest eminence when they propagated a set of norms,
religious in the one case and professional in the other, which were capable of
constraining untrammeled power on the part of political actors. But neither
religion nor professionalism today possess the power of constraint they once
enjoyed. Other sources of constraint are needed.
I want to speculate that Yale Law School in the 1980s succeeded Harvard
in preeminence by looking to other disciplines, especially economics,
history, political science, and philosophy, for sources of constraint. In the
late 1990s, NYU Law School turned to globalism—to an understanding that,
as America loses its hegemony and becomes merely one part of the larger
world, deep forces of that larger world will provide lawyers with a foundation
to preserve law as a constraint on the exercise of power by political leaders.
These are optimistic aspirations. Much more pessimistic are the ambitions

111. Robert W. Gordon & William Nelson, An Exchange on Critical Legal Studies Between
Robert W. Gordon and William Nelson, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 139, 167 (1998).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 185.
114. Conversation with Arthur R. Miller, Univ. Professor, N.Y.U. Sch. of Law (July 12,
2018). Professor Miller was a professor at Harvard Law School from 1972 to 2007.
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of Presidents Putin, Trump, and Xi, that rulers will deploy power with no
constraints whatsoever.
APPENDIX: TRANSCRIPT*
PROFESSOR ROBIN WEST: So two thoughts. First, I think that the
view of politics you’re describing is very, very dark. Politics itself is a
constraint on power in a well-functioning polity as well as the most important
vehicle for exercising power in good ways. So the vilification in ordinary
legal discourse of politics and the exercise of power and also in critical legal
discourse is, I think, alarming and unfortunate.
PROFESSOR WILLIAM NELSON: Can I respond to that before you get
to your second? I’m actually an optimist about politics. My concern is that
sometimes it goes bad, and, when it does, a lot of bad things can happen.
James Bradley Thayer seems to me to have the answer in saying courts
should not interfere in politics except in very clear cases.115 Frankfurter
agreed and kept saying courts shouldn’t do things; the political process
should do them.116 The political process needs to be encouraged and made
capable, and when courts interfere, they diminish its capability.
PROFESSOR WEST: I’m with you entirely on that. My limited point is
that there was an awful lot of shared ground between the old-guard liberals
and the CLS people about the alignment of politics with power and law with
reason. The Crits never really problematized the basic moral distinction
between power, bad politics, bad law, and good reason. If you can show that
law is really more like politics, then you’ve shown something important and
sort of malignant about law itself. But the Crits never did it, and I fault them
for that.
Now my second thought. In the first part of your paper you described a
distinction between the ordinary mission of ordinary law schools and an
exalted mission of a law school that identifies a higher purpose for law and
for itself.117 The rule against perpetuities, the holder in due course doctrine,
all of that I think has a lot of nobility to it and it is part of the mission of the
ordinary law school to convey that nobility. So I resist the idea that what
legal scholarship should be doing is exploring an exalted mission that will
identify its law school with something higher than ordinary law. You don’t
want to be just producing technicians but, on the other hand, let’s not
denigrate technicians.
PROFESSOR NELSON: Much of my take comes from teaching property
for thirty years or so. There is a nobility to a lot of property law. But that
* This discussion followed the author’s presentation of this Article at the Symposium. The
transcript has been lightly edited. For a list of the Symposium participants, see Matthew
Diller, Foreword: Legal Education in Twentieth-Century America, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 859
(2018).
115. See Thayer, supra note 67, at 155–56.
116. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Colegrove
v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946).
117. See supra notes 9–26 and accompanying text.
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nobility is overwhelmingly about preserving the status quo, and preserving
the status quo is overwhelmingly about making sure that the rich stay rich.
We can talk about efforts by judges to do some redistribution, such as the
Mount Laurel118 case in New Jersey, but the judiciary’s success has been
very limited because of institutional and procedural limitations on what
judges are able to do.
JUDGE GUIDO CALABRESI: I have quite a few different things to say.
First, on four different possible roles of scholarship. One is to present a
particular point of view, moral, ethical, for what society should be. And that
is what scholarship should be about. Which is how you described Fordham.
The second is for scholars to look in particular areas and create new
paradigms, new ways of looking at it all together. The third is simply to take
an area and move it forward, adjusted to the needs of the day. And the fourth
is simply synthesis, putting it all together clearly.
To go back to Fordham. I don’t think you can understand Fordham’s
position in the 1930s and its later decline apart from the position of
Catholicism—seen as an immigrant religion of foreigners who were
considered inferior to the rest. I know that because as an Italian Catholic
arriving here I had very little contact with American Catholicism because I
came from a place where Catholicism was dominant, where intellectual
Catholics were constantly disagreeing. It was not until I went to Oxford that
I found as snobbish a view of Catholicism as had been mine. Now this is
important because without it, one cannot understand some of the things going
on in the abortion debate. I’m talking about the unfortunate opinion by
Blackmun which says a fetus is not a person for purposes of our
Constitution119—the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant Constitution, not your
Constitution, not southern rebel, not Catholic immigrant. Once I was in a
taxi with Bill Buckley and the leading pro-life bishop of southern Illinois. I
asked them to suppose the result had been the same but that the opinion had
been: “There are life values here, and they’re there, and there are equality
values, and they’re there. In the technology of today we cannot do both, and
we decide for equality over life.” What would your reaction have been? Both
of them in one voice said we would not have liked the result but we could
have lived with it. But it’s too late to put the genie back in the bottle and stop
the return to an attitude toward Catholicism as separate, different, foreign,
and ultimately excluded from the American mainstream.
Now to Harvard. I think what you say is right, but I think you mark the
end too late. Now, I say that because the last great flowers of legal process
moved from Harvard to Yale with Bickel and Wellington and there they ran
into the “law and . . .” movement and the last great flowers of legal realism.
The combination forced them to look more broadly, the way Bickel and
Wellington did, and various new paradigms came out of Yale, starting with
118. See generally S. Burlington Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d
390 (N.J. 1983).
119. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (“All this . . . persuades us that the word
‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.”).
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the great appointments by Rostow in the fifties. Yeah, it wasn’t until the
seventies that people kind of looked back and saw how Harvard had lost its
preeminence. But I think you have to date it earlier because legal process did
not come to terms at Harvard until much later with legal realism, call it CLS,
and “law and . . . .” When I visited Harvard in 1970, what I was saying in
law and economics was absolutely new, but nobody there was even aware of
it except Frank Michelman.
PROFESSOR KENNETH MACK: I’d like to offer a different definition
of what makes a law school prominent and what we might define as decline.
You say the last great intellectual effort of Harvard Law School was legal
process; no, it was critical legal studies. The four big ideas about law since
1970 are law and economics, originalism, feminist legal theory, and critical
theory. And the reason we put critical theory in it would be in part because
of critical legal studies but also in part because of critical race theory. Critical
race theory is gargantuan at the moment; it is taught everywhere—often
outside law schools.
So where did critical race theory come from? It was invented in part by
three people at Harvard—Derrick Bell on the faculty and two students,
Kimberlé Crenshaw and Patricia Williams.120 Crenshaw and Williams were
part of a critical mass of fifty to seventy-five black students in each class.
Many of them reacted negatively to the old guard and tried to figure out:
What did law mean for them? Critical race theory was inspired in part by
impatience, criticism, and difficulty. They eventually wrote about it and
invented something called critical race theory. I was at Harvard with a
second group of future critical race theorists. It was great. We argued about
what law was. We argued about what race was. We argued about what the
relationship between race and power was.
Now, when I reconstruct the history of Harvard Law School, all these
people were produced by an atmosphere in which people were fighting. They
joined the fight, and they invented something new. Critical legal studies is
dead but critical race theory is everywhere, and it’s because of the process I
just described.
JUDGE CALABRESI: One thing about that. In the 1970s and 1980s, the
same thing was not going on in New Haven. The difference is that what has
been described as a disadvantage of Harvard because of size becomes an
enormous advantage. Yale had fifteen to twenty African Americans in a
class, and that’s a large number in that class but it’s still minuscule. At
Harvard, because of its size, you have a group which is enormous, and the
fact of size makes all the difference. The place has to be open to it, as it was,
but it gives a tremendous advantage to Harvard and there is no doubt that
Harvard and Harvard graduates have taken advantage of it to the good of the
nation.

120. See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT, supra note 107 (containing essays by Derrick Bell, Kimberlé Crenshaw, and
Patricia Williams, among others).
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PROFESSOR MACK: One other addendum. I’m sort of the inventor of
the story, but it’s true. Barack Obama was there in the late 1980s. We were
classmates, and he’s in the middle of all this and basically he’s figuring out
who he is as a public person in the midst of all the contestation. It’s the first
place that he really gets validated that he’s going to be somebody important
in American life. And it’s because he is in the middle of this contestation
that he’s got to figure out where he fits in—or doesn’t fit.
JUDGE CALABRESI: When you’re talking white, Anglo-Saxon
Protestants, even Irish today, if there’s a few more from Harvard, there’s
some from Yale, it really doesn’t matter. But when you’re talking about the
degree of diversity that is accomplished in society, then the size of the place
is what makes it from my point of view still dominant.
PRESIDENT EMERITUS JOHN SEXTON: I’m very nervous when we
begin to make a uniqueness or deep mission an important element in a law
school’s success.
PROFESSOR NELSON: I agree with much of what Guido, Ken, and John
have said. As to my dating, it is clear from the perspective of today that
Yale’s faculty was doing more interesting scholarship than Harvard’s in the
1960s. But from the perspective of 1965, the Harvard faculty of James
Casner, Archibald Cox, Mark De Wolfe Howe, Paul Freund, Lon Fuller,
Henry Hart, Louis Jaffe, Ben Kaplan, Louis Loss, Al Sacks, and others
looked mighty preeminent in comparison with the handful of young people
at Yale who had not yet done most of their major work.
As to critical race theory, I’m a fan. Feminist theory as well. But they’re
different from critical legal studies. CLS is based on a concept of a
fundamental contradiction that renders all law political and, as I said in my
1988 debate with Bob Gordon,121 thereby undermines the capacity of good
law to trump bad politics. I’ve always understood that, since the colonial
period, American law has not been contradictory but has been driven by
commitments to individual liberty and community self-rule and that those
commitments will trump bad politics. Thus, I disagree with the Crits.
Equality for women and minorities, in contrast, entered the picture in the
mid-nineteenth century and has been in conflict with liberty and local selfrule ever since. There is a fundamental contradiction here, and feminist
theory and critical race theory are both striving to resolve the contradiction
in favor of equality. They have gone beyond CLS in addressing a real
contradiction, and I’m with them.
I need to note, however, that both were minority positions at Harvard after
1970, and thus neither became the mission of the Law School in the fashion
that professionalism had been the sole mission from 1870 to 1970. Like John,
I become nervous when a school adopts a single, unique, unitary mission, but
I believe I am correct historically in recognizing that both Fordham and
Harvard did so and gained special prominence as a result.

121. See generally Gordon & Nelson, supra note 111.

